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Abstract
The number of wildfires occurring globally is exacerbated by urbanisation and changes in 
weather patterns. In response, researchers have conducted studies of wildfires and human 
behaviour in regions such as Australia and the USA. Regions in Europe have received less 
attention, despite facing the same issues. Even more overlooked are one particular type of 
territory: islands. With their climates, islands across the Mediterranean remain attractive 
second home and tourist destinations, resulting in urban development. Yet due to certain 
features (e.g. cultural, socio-political, geographical), the ways in which their people deal with 
wildfires may differ somewhat from that in some mainland territories. This paper explores 
human behaviour in wildfire emergencies in the context of island vulnerability and resilience 
in Europe, with the Mediterranean island of Corsica as a case study. Qualitative analysis of 
semi-structured interviews (n = 8) with Corsican professionals involved in wildfire management 
and quantitative analysis of around 100 surveys from civilians was conducted. This analysis 
revealed that Corsica’s population approach to wildfire safety is shaped by available 
information as well as a strong risk culture, which stands in contrast with new/temporary 
residents moving into the island each summer season. The results drawn from the analysed 
sample suggest potential social vulnerability in wildfires when a decision to evacuate the 
population is taken by emergency managers as the most effective emergency response. 
Population behaviour were not influenced by property attachment, perceived risk, hazard 
knowledge, community closeness and locus of control, suggesting that island WUI resident 
characteristics may not be generalised from human behaviour in wildfires studies carried out 
in the USA or Australia. 






























































Wildfires are a recognised major risk to communities across Europe [1], especially in the 
Mediterranean region [2], and more research is attending to the effects of wildfires on 
populations’ vulnerability in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) [3]. Nonetheless, less research 
is focused on understanding these populations’ preparedness for and their lived experiences 
in responding to wildfire events, for example having to evacuate their homes. While current 
studies on human responses to wildfires are mostly focused on North American and Australian 
populations [4,5,6], studies particular to the context of European populations are rare, 
particularly so for the islands at-risk from wildfires [7,8].
This paper begins by reviewing the occurrence of wildfires in the islands in the 
Mediterranean and across Europe, as well as contextualises important features of WUI 
communities, recognised by wildfire research, to islands. Key elements widely reported to 
influence human behaviour in disasters are outlined and their importance for one European 
island with a WUI population, Corsica, is explored. The results highlight the differences and 
convergence between the findings across risk culture, wildfire management and response to 
a developing fire, comparing the results with those from previous studies and their implications 
for policy.
1.1 Island wildfires 
Wildfires are a major challenge connected to urban sprawl. Growing cities force humans 
further into natural territories, both through the outward extension of the city limits and through 
generating a desire in some to permanently or temporarily escape densely built-up areas 
[9,10]. Growing cities also draw people in from rural communities, with forestation replacing 
their now abandoned farmland, resulting in wider areas covered in more combustible 
vegetation [9]. This movement, of city limits, of people to and from more isolated settlements, 
and of vegetation, results in a clash between wildland and urban areas, the so-called wildland-
urban interface (WUI) [11]. Proximity between human habitats and wildland causes 
abnormalities in natural land cover, subsequent changes in weather patterns, posing the risk 
of fires to WUI residents [2], and depreciation of landscape resulting after fire affected 
environmental degradation [12]. In addition, it is predicted that climate change will have a 
significant effect on lengthening the fire season across Europe and the number of fire danger 
days in the Mediterranean region is going to increase [1,2]. In fact, extreme weather anomalies 
and low precipitation have already resulted in an unusual number of wildfires in Scandinavian 
and Baltic regions in 2014 and 2018-2019 [13,60,61,62,63], as well as caused an 
unprecedented number of wildfire-related deaths recently in Greece (91 fatalities) and in 




























































evacuations throughout Europe’s southern regions that same year [83], for which official 
evacuation records are still unavailable. 
Each year, from 2000 to 2009, south-western Europe (specifically Italy, France, Spain, 
Portugal, and Greece) experienced around 57,000 wildfires, resulting in 430,000 hectares 
being burned [67]. While no official statistics exist on how many of these fires disrupted the 
lives and affected the well-being of the populations on each of the aforementioned countries’ 
islands, available research indicates that such effects may indeed be substantial [3,65,66]. 
Along with research into wildfire occurrence and dynamics, recent media coverage illustrates 
some of the impact to the communities: Madeira (Portugal) [79], Ibiza (Spain) [78], Corsica 
(France) [83], Sicily (Italy) [80], and Zante (Greece) [81] are a just few examples of extreme 
fire events requiring mass evacuations and claiming individual lives on European islands. 
Environmental changes are particularly problematic on islands, where topography is often 
complicated [12] and as a result in the event of fire civilians or their vehicles can block fire 
vehicle access (P. Colombani & O. Tomi 2017, personal communication, 18 April). Islands 
may experience challenges in adaptability to climate change and local disaster management 
capacity [14]. Moreover, islands may be isolated in terms of the physical distance involved for 
the mainland to provide often required support by air [15], as well as have a limited capacity 
to relocate individuals requiring the use of alternative evacuation methods such as boats [16], 
thereby increasing the risk for both local resident and tourist populations. Nevertheless, 
islands may also have a good capacity for resilience [17], possessing local knowledge systems 
[18] that may allow for personal and community resilience in the face of a disaster. Historical 
memory is often at the core of such resilience and emergency response awareness [19,20], 
but changes in policies or housing and emergency response planning uncover new 
vulnerabilities. Identifying such effects in time before the next disaster happens could help 
improve community safety.
1.2 WUI community vulnerability and resilience
A disaster is formed of a combination between a hazard and vulnerability [21] and is 
followed by multiple consequences, such as a loss of lives and livelihoods, and traumatic 
experiences [22]. Wildfires – referred to as forest fires in places – are rapidly claiming their 
place among other highly devastating disasters [79] caused by human activity, both unthinking 
and malicious behaviour, and natural phenomena (e.g. lightning).
Vulnerability to a wildfire is particularly evident in communities that have little or no capacity 
to cope or adapt in response to the hazard. Vulnerability traits are not entirely opposite to 




























































regulations for disaster can conflict with habituated responses by populations in at-risk areas, 
as is deeply rooted in the understanding of sociology of everyday practice [24]. It suggests 
that communities’ relationship with the environment cannot merely be defined through 
evacuation policies and mitigation of fire hazards; a deeper connection should be 
acknowledged. 
Thus, apart from geographical features of the WUI, it is recognised that WUI communities 
differ in their social and economic aspects that influence their response to disasters [20,25]. 
To illustrate this, some suggest that individuals living in WUI, compared to city dwellers, 
possess specific characteristics, such as adaptability, informal relationship and knowledge 
fostering, often related to “generational ties” [25, p.1089]. The authors further argue that WUI 
residents differ in their special local spatial knowledge, are networked and understand the 
wildfire risks [25]. Thus, cultural and social ties within the community are somewhat a 
distinguishing feature of WUI residents (also noted by [26]) that contribute to their resilience 
to disasters. 
The arguments around distinguishing features of WUI communities are attributed to the 
variety of land use types and ownership in the WUI, meaning that populations with a “different 
set of values, lifestyles, and land ethics” are coming into coexistence [27, p.705]. This often 
results in tension arising from the conflict between the newcomers and established 
communities and their culture [27]. Conceptually, a community’s core idea is social interaction 
[28] which potentially shapes individuals’ involvement in wildfire risk mitigation [25]. Studies of 
social cohesion analyse how such social interaction and social organisation may positively 
influence community resilience [29] in response to disasters. However, such research more 
often looks at communities from a geographical perspective [30], not accounting for dynamic 
population changes such as those observed in small islands due to summer tourism and 
recreational seasons, and do not raise questions of the possibility of non-uniform wildfire 
knowledge and conflicting population interests.
1.3 Human behaviour in wildfires
Research on human behaviour in wildfires has already shown that individuals tend to act 
on their own ‘agenda’ when it comes to responding to evacuation warnings [20,31]. For 
example, often people will delay evacuation, evacuate when it is not needed, create traffic 
congestion in vulnerable areas, or simply take too long to understand the risks that they are 
facing [32], including returning to their homes before it is safe to do so [33]. Such behaviour is 
found to be consistently reported by the media throughout the recent (2016–2018) wildfire 




























































Nevertheless, there is little research looking at the core challenges and particularities of island 
WUI populations and their behavioural responses to a wildfire. Such quantitative studies are 
relatively scarce, even more so for parts of Europe and, further still, for European islands. 
Qualitative studies exist but mostly for larger wildfire regions such as the USA and Australia 
[18,37]. Therefore, to identify key factors to explore, ones that might influence the behavioural 
responses of the island WUI populations to wildfires, more expansive literature on other types 
of disaster that could prompt evacuation, such as hurricanes, was consulted, as well as the 
existing studies on wildfires from other regions. Five such variables, outlined below, have been 
repeatedly explored across these studies: property attachment, risk perception, hazard 
knowledge, community closeness, and locus of control [20,44,47,48]. These variables were of 
particular interest due to their relation to aforementioned WUI community features, risk culture, 
wildfire preparedness, and possible connections with evacuation decision-making.
Attention is often drawn to individuals’ property attachment, where greater attachment, 
according to the literature, is associated with a reluctance to evacuate [44,45]. It has mostly 
been measured in ‘years’ of residence [20] but could also be captured by type of resident, e.g. 
permanent resident living in their primary residence vs. temporary resident staying somewhere 
on vacation. Perception of personal risk when residing in an at-risk area has shown to be a 
significant factor for deciding to evacuate in studies of both actual and hypothetical wildfire 
situations [44]; on the other hand, separate research found that perceived threat was not a 
sign of early mobilisation [48]. Thus, this factor needs further exploring. Another important 
factor is seen to be individuals’ hazard knowledge, which increases both the likelihood of 
receiving warnings [48] and the likelihood of perceiving risk [47]. At the same time, official 
information sources during the disaster also result in greater population compliance [49]. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be little exploration of a connection between where knowledge 
of a hazard comes from and preparation for a potential emergency. In addition, studies also 
find that involvement in one’s community and close relationships within communities increase 
the likelihood of receiving a warning in an emergency as well as the likelihood of evacuation 
[20,48]. Finally, locus of control (LOC), which relates to a belief about who or what has control 
over what happens to people, is seen to matter in decision-making in response to disasters. 
For instance, individuals with a strong internal locus believe they themselves can control the 
outcome of events while those with a strong external locus believe outside forces, for example 
spiritual beings, are in control (see [50]). Even when rejected as non-significant in disasters 
such as hurricanes [44], LOC is a relatively unexplored concept in groups with non-uniform 
beliefs [51,52] in which religiousness seems to decrease the likelihood of evacuation [20], but 




























































Thus, whilst a body of literature analysing human responses to disasters is growing, 
insufficient attention is paid to WUI communities’ preparedness and response to wildfires on 
European islands. Such knowledge is paramount to the safety of these communities given the  
wildfire risks projected for the future. Therefore, this study aimed to take a first step at 
addressing that gap. The objective was to understand what factors may influence responses 
to wildfires and what cultural aspects of a WUI island population may affect their capacity to 
cope in the event of a wildfire. The case of Corsica, located in the South of France, was 
chosen. To answer the research questions, interviews with professionals involved in wildfire 
management and questionnaire surveys with civilians were conducted in Corsica. This offered 
a rich view that contextualised human behavioural responses to wildfires in an island WUI, 
provided an insight into official aspects and observations of the people’s culture and 
behaviour, as well as offered first-hand accounts of behaviours and motivations to compare 
with those observations. The findings are targeted primarily at policymakers, to highlight areas 
for consideration when shaping wildfire management policies, as well as at practitioners who 
implement the policies, to assist their understanding of what behaviours and challenges they 
may or may not encounter when attempting to protect WUI island populations.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1 Study area 
As part of the Mediterranean region, Corsica is the fourth largest island in the basin. Over the 
period of 2013-2017 there have been around 2,663 wildfires in Corsica, although some data 
remains unprocessed by the main database used for this research [38]. The ‘hotspots’ of fire 
occurrence over this 4-year period can be seen in Fig. 1. Thus this island provides a unique 
study area for risk culture research, as it is estimated that out of 360 Corsican communes, 200 





























































Fig. 1 Corsican communes where wildfires occurred during 2013-2017 (based on data 
available at http://www.promethee.com/incendies).
The northern part of the island (which until recent political changes was known as the 
Haute-Corse department) has seen the largest wildfire occurrence, while the southern part 
(until recently known as the Corse-du-Sud department) has suffered the largest burned area 
by such fires. Areas burned here vary from a mean fire size of 0.08 km2 to 55.32 km2 burned 
in a single event (data based on the period from 1995 to 2009) [67]. The north’s driest region, 
Balagne, as well as being one of the more largely populated parts of Corsica, is also 
considered to be most susceptible to wildfires [39]. Susceptibility to wildfire may be due to 
climatic conditions and, with cool winters and hot, dry and windy summers, Corsica’s 
vegetation types are typical examples of the Mediterranean land cover (i.e. in terms of their 
nature and, importantly, combustibility). Additionally, the decline in agriculture as an economic 
source, and accompanying land abandonment, has meant vegetation growth has been less 
controlled in Corsica [85]. It is predicted that due to changes of land use and climate change, 
ecosystems will change and colonise the areas that are not yet exposed to wildfires, increasing 
ecosystem vulnerability [12]. However, it is not only vegetation that is growing. Despite only 
2% of the Corsican island being covered by urban or other anthropic areas, populated by 0.3 
million inhabitants [67], urbanisation is continuously expanding [73], and the population almost 
doubles in summer peak periods [69,70], with tourists staying in the cities and towns as well 
as more isolated settlements such as villages, campsites and refuges on hiking trails [68]. 




























































Europe, which sees large numbers of local and tourist populations during the peak wildfire 
seasons [71]. 
Therefore, Corsica’s geography, dynamic demographic and socio-economic profiles make 
it a useful case study for island vulnerability research. Nevertheless, Ganteaume and Jappiot 
[40] note the lack of available studies on large fires in southern Europe, particularly in France, 
compared to the South West of Australia, California (USA) and South Africa. In the case of 
Corsica, underrepresentation is often prominent due to the island being seen simply as part 
of the Mediterranean territory [41]. Vilain-Carlotti [41] identified the specific issues surrounding 
the contemporary wildfire risk in Corsica, such as change in land use, new clusters of 
settlements in the WUI and their increased exposure to wildfire hazard, making it one of the 
few studies that only begin to explore relationships between socio-economic and cultural 
factors, the natural environment and wildfires on this island [54]. 
2.2 Semi-structured interviews
To contextualise human behaviour in wildfire within an island WUI context, semi-structured 
interviews with representatives of Corsica’s wildfire management network were conducted. 
The interviews (n = 8) were carried out throughout April 2017 before that year’s wildfire season 
commenced, allowing optimal access to the participants’ time. The participants were 
purposefully sampled [33] to engage in face-to-face audio-recorded (with consent) 
discussions, which were conducted at participants’ workplaces lasting 30-45 minutes on 
average. 
The interviewees were from multiple organisations with diverse responsibilities including 
the emergency services, voluntary services, forest management agencies, local government, 
plus others responsible for areas of habitation. They were the chief of a fire service, two 
incident commanders, a fire officer whose duties covered frontline firefighting and prevention 
work, a co-ordinator of civilian reserves, an official from the National Forests Office, a mayor, 
and a campsite owner. The interview sampling stopped early when saturation of answers was 
reached. Saturation was seen to be achieved when responses did not deviate from each other, 
therefore no new themes were arising from the collected data [72]. Despite the interviewees’ 
backgrounds representing different branches of the wildfire management network, the 
responses received were all in line with the national policy and risk plans.
The interviewer’s question schedule – constituting two parts (I) behavioural responses of 
individuals and (II) emergency planning, preparedness and response (Table 1) – was 
designed to capture information on risk, planning, and observations of common patterns of 




























































prompts that elicited lengthy answers from the interviewees; follow-up questions were asked 
where appropriate. Thus, the interview format allowed for more in-depth discussion of the 
behaviours’ context such as risk culture, policy and compliance. Typically, discussions were 
in French and relevant points written-up into English subsequently.
Table 1. Interview questions for professionals.
Item Part I – Behavioural responses
1 What are your main tasks, roles and responsibilities during emergencies and evacuations?
2 Could you describe your observations of inappropriate responses to forest fires by 
individuals in this community?
3 Could you describe what would be the appropriate behaviours for what you have just 
mentioned?
4 What are the actions of individuals that make your response difficult or complicate it?
Part II – Emergency planning, preparedness and response
1 What are the main disaster risks that Corsica faces?
2 What would you say resilience and vulnerability mean in Corsica?
3 Does island status compromise or enhance Corsica’s capacity in fighting forest fires and 
protecting civilians? If so, how? 
4 How is Corsica’s resilience to forest fires different to that of the rest of France’s?
5 Do you feel that you can get substantial support from mainland France if needed when 
fighting fires and protecting civilians in forest fires? 
6 Do you feel that there is enough understanding among people in Corsica on what to do in 
the case of a forest fire?
7 When is the decision to shelter-in-place taken over the decision to evacuate?
Thematic analysis was employed to reduce and clarify interview data [42], and to derive 
the national context [43], i.e. help elicit indications of potentially more abstract concepts such 
as Corsica’s risk culture and its people’s general attitudes towards forest fires. The following 
themes were derived, each highlighting elements of human behaviour: (1) risk culture, (2) 
wildfire management and (3) responses to a developing wildfire, including evacuation.
2.3 Questionnaire Survey 
To gain first-hand accounts of the behaviours and motivations of people when faced with 
the threat of a WUI wildfire, as well as explore the influence of the five key factors identified in 
section 1.3, a questionnaire survey was employed with civilians in Corsica. As the intended 
responses of civilians living in at-risk areas but with no recent/any experience of wildfires was 
as much of interest as the actual responses of civilians with recent experience, two 




























































wildfire scenarios while the second asked about real, experienced scenarios. The use of actual 
experience (AE) and hypothetical (H) case questionnaires was encouraged by past results 
showing a “degree of similarity between the effect sizes” [44, p.1014] calculated from data 
from both types of questionnaire as well as the finding that individuals’ intentions (e.g. to 
evacuate in the event of emergency) are usually eventually realised [59]. 
The questionnaire was disseminated online via the social media channels Facebook and 
Twitter, where an official account for the research study was created and civilians across 
Corsica were targeted using a geo-targeting tool. In addition, participant recruitment was 
facilitated by engagement with the French regional news outlet Corse-Matin, which ran a 
feature advertising the study’s aims and objectives, and by engagement with a Corsican fire 
and rescue service (until recently known as SDIS 2B, now SIS 2B), who disseminated the 
survey via their own social media channels. Non-probabilistic sampling was chosen due to the 
difficulty in reaching wildfire survivors, because no public or private list of such individuals and 
their contact details exists in Corsica, and because survivors may be protective of their privacy 
in order to avoid press intrusion. Therefore, the sampling method known as self-selection was 
used, recognising that while it may over-represent certain segments of the population, in the 
past this method has shown to nevertheless sufficiently inform study findings [74]. Because 
participants were difficult to reach in this sense, as well as in a physical sense given their 
locations across Corsica, an online survey was the most feasible data collection method, 
reducing time, effort and costs, as well as offering a paperless solution. The questionnaire was 
available in both English and French. All participants were informed that their participation 
would be anonymous and voluntary, with no financial incentives offered. The data was 
collected during the peak forest fire season in Corsica 2017 – August to September; in the 
past, studies have shown this to be a good time to capture participants’ attention, since many 
individuals are actively interested in the ongoing phenomena [75]. Data collection stopped 
once all available channels of dissemination were exploited and a wide coverage of Corsican 
communes was observed. 
The design of survey questions were guided by the Bushfire CRC questionnaire 
administered to survivors of the Black Saturday bushfires in Australia, 2009 [46]. The 
questions were comprehensive, taking around 25 minutes to complete in total, and covered 
topics such as: experience and preparedness; socio-demographic and other personal factors; 
behavioural responses (actions, emotions and cognitions) to various environmental and social 
cues, including whether the participant decided to evacuate or stay, both in relation to the 
actually experienced/hypothetical scenario in question and in relation to if a similar wildfire 
event were to occur in the future; plus situational factors. Given the subject matter, participants 




























































on wildfires and were provided with links at the end of the questionnaire to local providers of 
confidential support and advice. 
Table 2. Codes used for the statistical analysis.
Variables Codes Definitions
Permanent resident = 1 Participant owned or rented the property and it 
was their primary residence.
Property attachment
Temporary resident = 0 Participant was staying over at the property as a 
visitor/vacationer/worker/in some other capacity.
High risk = 1 Participant rated themself as either being ‘to a 
great extent’ or ‘somewhat’ concerned.
Perceived risk
Low risk = 0 Participant rated themself as either being ‘to a 
very little extent’ or ‘not at all’ concerned.
Had a plan = 1 Participant/their household had formally 
prepared a plan.
Planning for wildfires
Had no plan = 0 Participant/their household had not formally 
prepared a plan or had made no plan at all.
High closeness = 1 Participant rated themself as either being ‘to a 
great extent’ or ‘somewhat’ close.
Community closeness
Low closeness = 0 Participant rated themself as either being ‘to a 
very little extent’ or ‘not at all’ close.
Internal LOC = 1 Participant chose one or more answers that 
included the option ‘myself’.
Locus of control
External LOC = 0 Participant chose one or more answers that did 
not include the option ‘myself’.
For the first of the five key factors, the questionnaire asked participants to describe their 
relationship to the property in which they were residing, to attain a proxy measure of 
attachment to that property. Answers were coded into two dichotomous categories (see Table 
2 for codes and their definitions). For perceived risk, participants were asked for the extent to 
which they were concerned about a wildfire affecting them or their property, while for 
community closeness participants were asked for the extent to which they were close, in a 
social sense, to those in their community (i.e. their neighbours). Answers to both these 
questions were on a Likert-type scale and were again coded into two categories. For hazard 
knowledge, participants were asked to describe the sources (if any) from which they gained 
information in the last 12 months about how to prepare for a wildfire, and also were asked if, 
in the same time period, they (or their household) had prepared a plan to take some action, 
be it to evacuate or stay, in the event of a wildfire. Answers about information sources could 
be multiple and remained so. Answers about a plan were coded into two categories. Finally, 
for locus of control, participants were asked about who they believe has control over wildfire 
consequences to them and their property. Answers on this question could also be multiple, 
with options including ‘myself’, ‘luck’, ‘spiritual being’, ‘government authorities’, ‘emergency 




























































sample were asked to answer the questions about the above variables in relation to their pre-
fire situation rather than their current situation.
A total of 98 completed questionnaires were included in the following analysis. Participants 
were from a variety of Corsican communes (see Fig. 2), including Ajaccio, Biguglia and Borgo, 
which are relatively larger towns or towns that have historically been affected more by forest 
fires. The ages of AE participants (n=48) ranged from 20 to 71 years (M=45.93, SD=14.91). 
For males (51% of AE sample), the mean age was 46.71 years (SD=14.20) and for females 
(49% of AE sample), the mean age was 45.09 years (SD=15.93). Similarly, the age range for 
H participants (n=50) was 21 to 75 years (M=43.50, SD=13.47), with a mean age of 44.37 
years (SD=14.44) for males (38%) and 42.97 years (SD=13.06) for females (62%). The ratio 
of males to females did not differ significantly between the AE and H samples (X2(1) = 1.68, p 
= .196), nor did the mean age of participants (t(94) = 0.84, p = .403). 
Fig. 2. Population distribution (left; source: IGN ® Insee; red colour denotes areas with more than 500 
habitants, green with less than 500 habitants); questionnaire respondent distribution (right: based on 
data available at http://www.promethee.com/incendies).
2.4 Statistical analysis
For the questionnaire data, statistical analysis of relationships between variables typically 
took the form of tests of 2 x 2 cross-tabulations. An alpha level of .05 was used as the cut-off 
for statistical significance in all tests. Using the tool G*Power v3.1 [77] to conduct a power 
analysis – with degrees of freedom = 1, alpha level = .05, power = .8, and effect size = .4 (i.e. 
medium to large) – it was calculated that a minimum sample size of around 50 participants 
would be sufficient for this type of analysis. While there is some debate amongst statisticians 




























































paper followed the procedure common in the social sciences, i.e. used Chi-Square Test except 
for where expected frequencies were lower than five; then Fisher’s Exact Test was used (Field, 
2015). The associated p-values and effect sizes (Cramer’s V) are reported. Data was analysed 




To a certain degree, the understanding of risks among the Corsican population seems to 
have come as a generational inheritance, noted in the literature as part of the features 
depicting island resilience [17]. It is currently sustained through the local fire services’ initiative 
to educate schoolchildren about wildfire risk mitigation and behaviour during wildfires:
“Culture of risks begin at school and it is better understood by adults if they have the first 
information very early. Children talk also to their parents [about] what is good and what is not 
good and presumably it has a bigger effect.”– civilian reserves co-ordinator. 
Emphasis was put on inherent knowledge (“It’s our culture – people are sensitized to 
wildfires, they know what they have to do. We have more problem with summer vacationers 
than local people” – incident commander) but it was noted to be currently challenged by 
growing urbanisation. For example, individuals often insist on building homes in the high 
wildfire risk areas, for which permissions are not granted. In addition, a fire officer noted that 
people are now starting to build wooden structures, instead of making homes from highly 
popular rock material, which increases vulnerability in wildfires.
Since Corsica is considered to be an attractive holiday place for people from mainland 
France as well as the rest of Europe, the population in peak summer periods (July-September) 
almost doubles. Local school holidays also coincide with these peak periods (July-August), 
when families often choose to go camping. A change in risk culture was noted by most of the 
interviewees as a result of the influx of new permanent residents to the island as well as 
growing tourism. While tourists were said to be more rule-obedient compared to local residents 
in the presence of authority such as firefighters, tourists were also less equipped with 
knowledge of what to do when the firefighters were not present.
“As there is a lot of people [in summer] there is a lot of imprudence; they do barbeque and 




























































Nevertheless, the local population was generally thought to be desensitized to wildfires 
and capable of protecting themselves from hazards. In essence, the local population who have 
been living in Corsica for a few generations have useful knowledge, such as regarding the 
direction and speed of wind and the behaviour of fire. For this reason, they are able to make 
more informed decisions compared to tourist and transient populations: 
“If we have a knowledge that 1, 2 or 3 people in the village can be alone in the fire, maybe 
we say there is no more risks because they have the culture of wildfire, but if we have 1 or 
10 people who are new inhabitants here it would be more dangerous because of them” – 
civilian reserves co-ordinator.
Wildfire risk mitigation issues seem to rest with long-term local populations rather than 
transients, while the latter are more obedient regarding rules: 
 “First, for the new habitants it is easier to make them clear the field grounds [i.e. engage in 
mandatory land clearing activities, such as pruning or removing vegetation around buildings] 
but in case of wildfires there is panic; with the older habitants, it is more difficult to make 
them clean their fields but in case of wildfire or smoke there is no panic, people are safer.” – 
town mayor.
3.1.2 Questionnaires
As the interviews highlighted factors such as being a long-term local vs. transient, wildfire 
exposure, and associations with risk perception and decision-making behaviour, the analysis 
of questionnaire data first focused on these issues. 
Although the questionnaire was administered during the peak tourist season, the majority 
of respondents (AE: 59%; H: 69%) were in the ‘permanent resident’ category. The remaining 
AE respondents who were a ‘temporary resident’ were more likely to perceive ‘high’ (75%) 
rather than ‘low’ (25%) risk, i.e. have a greater level of concern about a wildfire affecting them 
or their property; however, so too were respondents who were a ‘permanent resident’ (high 
risk = 76%; low risk = 24%). As such, no significant relationship was found between AE 
participants’ property attachment and their perceived risk (p = 1.00, V = .01). A similar situation 
was revealed for H participants’ property attachment and perceived risk (temporary resident: 
high risk = 57%, low risk = 43%; permanent resident: high risk = 55%, low risk = 45%; p = 
1.00, V = .02). When it came to their evacuation decision, AE participants who were a 
‘permanent resident’ more often stayed (72%) than evacuated (28%); however, so too did 
participants who were a ‘temporary resident’, and at a somewhat greater frequency than the 




























































AE participants’ property attachment and the decision to evacuate or not (p = .628, V = .17). 
Note, H participants were asked for their evacuation decision across multiple related scenarios 
rather than a single scenario, thus a similar test was not conducted for them.
In terms of wildfire exposure, 54% of H respondents had never experienced a wildfire, 18% 
had experienced a fire once but in the distant past, and a slightly larger proportion (28%) had 
experienced a fire more than once but again in the distant past. With AE respondents, 19% 
reported that their recent wildfire experience was their only one while 81% had experienced a 
wildfire more than once. Additionally, 40% of all AE respondents had experienced an 
evacuation due to a wildfire, whereas 60% had not. Those AE respondents who had 
experienced multiple wildfires did not perceive a significantly different level of risk (high risk = 
75%; low risk = 25%) than those with just a single recent wildfire experience (high risk = 78%; 
low risk = 22%; p = 1.00, V = .03). Likewise, the level of perceived risk reported by H 
respondents was not significantly associated to their wildfire exposure (never experienced: 
high risk = 58%, low risk = 42%; experienced once: high risk = 57%, low risk = 43%; 
experienced more than once: high risk = 50%, low risk = 50%; Fisher-Freeman-Halton p = 
.917, V = .08). Regarding decision making, AE respondents who had experienced multiple 
wildfires did not choose to evacuate (27%) during their recent wildfire experience at a 
significantly different frequency than those with just a single recent wildfire experience (0%) 
(p = .542, V = .23); nor were they significantly more or less likely to choose to evacuate in 
future (29%) than those with a single experience (33%) (p = 1.00, V = .03). However, AE 
respondents who had prior evacuation experience were significantly more likely to choose to 
evacuate in future (56%) than those with no evacuation experience (9%) (p = .050, V = .50). 
A relationship between risk perception and decision making was explored next. Regarding 
concern about a wildfire affecting them or their property, AE and H respondents were not 
significantly different in this respect: the majority (76% and 56%, respectively) perceived a 
‘high’ level of risk (X2(1) = 3.80, p = .051, Cramer’s V = .21). In the AE sample, 100% of 
participants who perceived the risk to be ‘low’ stayed at their property during their recent 
wildfire experience, whereas 71% of those who perceived the risk to be ‘high’ stayed, but there 
was no significant relationship between perceived risk and evacuation decision (p = .298, V = 
.27).
3.2 Wildfire management 
3.2.1 Interviews
Currently, the only emergency communication tools used are television (France 3) and 
radio (Bleu RCFM, 101.7). For some communes (administrative division comparable to a 
municipality), government projects involving text message notifications are being developed, 




























































In the case of a wildfire emergency on camping sites, site managers use megaphones to alert 
the campers. In most cases affecting areas where people are residing, homeowners would be 
visited by a firefighter or a police officer and informed face-to-face about the need to leave 
their property. Fire and rescue service officers would also communicate the wildfire risks and 
events to the prefecture (the administration that carries out governmental work at the 
departmental level) and the prefecture would put up the relevant information on their website 
(e.g. haute-corse.gouv.fr) for the public to access. Such information is regularly checked by 
the tourist information centres, who may advise people against their trekking plans in certain 
areas if the fire danger is high or a wildfire is present.
Wildfire risk is assessed each day at 9.30 am and 5.30 pm. In the case of an emergency 
in Corsica, the command centre at the fire and rescue service headquarters, called CODIS, 
serves two functions: (1) alert processing through an alert management system, which draws 
upon calls staff receive from the European emergency number 24/7; and (2) operations 
management, which can involve receiving communications from the ground as well as 
communicating with their GPS-tracked vehicles. CODIS staff numbers increase during the 
summer due to the increased fire risk. The call centre receives approximately 100,000 calls 
every year and carries out 15,000 operations.
While Corsican fire response training is extensive and support from mainland France was 
noted to be strong and reliable, some disparity between Corsican and mainland France’s 
response capacity exists: 
 “we have people who are ready to face fire catastrophes, but we don’t have structures and 
materials and proximity with the rest of the France to be [as] well prepared as them” – 
incident commander.
In addition, the inability to receive support from other EU countries was highlighted as a 
potential drawback, since countries such as Italy or Greece use a different type of equipment 
that cannot be used in conjunction with the equipment in Corsica. At the same time, Corsica’s 
isolation with regards to time taken to receive support via air and by ferries due to island 
geography also impacts the capacity to fight fires. 
Another vulnerability of the island comes down to its changing climate (stronger winds and 
higher temperatures), growing urbanisation and the change of land use: 
“There is no more presence in the field, like agriculture and people who have farms, […]; a 
lot of people now want to work in the beach, in the city, and the shops, and not as farmers; 
the field is abandoned, there is no cleared areas and if you have a fire, it could be a very big 




























































Overall, tourists’ and the general population’s safety depends significantly on fire safety 
planning, evacuation operation plans and strategic firefighting, all of which is detailed for each 
of the communes in the communal information document on major hazards called DICRIM (Le 
Document d’Information Communal sur les Risques Majeurs) and in a forest protection plan 
against fires called PPFENI (Plan de Protection des Forets et des Espaces Naturels Contre 
les Incendies). Nevertheless, cooperation from people in danger is essential to make the most 
of the fire safety services’ work. For example, there exists a regulation to clear 50m of 
vegetation and debris around structures and homes, with occupants collaborating with 
neighbours when such 50m overlap or stem into a territory beyond ownership. People are also 
asked to be vigilant in times of a total fire ban (July-September) and in cases of fire to follow 
emergency services’ orders. Such expectations are conveyed to people through information 
at schools and in public spaces, but limitations to absorbing such information are seen as 
depending on ‘human nature’:
 “when fire arrives, people are stressed and panic, so it is important for us to speak to people 
[to tell them] what to do in wildfires; it is a long-term work because it is complementary to the 
work of firefighters and it is important to let people know they are responsible for their own 
security” – civilian reserves co-ordinator.
Firefighters’ priorities are divided in order of (1) saving lives, (2) saving property, and (3) 
fighting fire; but, as vocalised in the interviews, the population does not always seem to 
understand that and mistake the third priority as the most important one.
3.2.2 Questionnaires
Factors arising from this part of the interviews included the communication of information, 
planning, collaboration within the community, and the importance of individuals realising that 
they themselves play a role in what happens when a fire occurs. So, the analysis of the 
questionnaire data now addressed these factors. 
When survey respondents were asked whether they had received any information from a 
range of sources about preparing for wildfires, either in the 12 months before the fire in 
question (AE) or simply in the last 12 months (H) (see Fig. 3), newspapers were identified as 
the main information source.  Television, radio, internet, as well as social media, were also 
identified as information sources by a sizeable proportion of participants. Also, approximately 
one third of AE respondents said that they had not received information from any of the 
suggested sources, while just under one quarter of H respondents highlighted such a lack of 
information (although some did report that they had received information from other kinds of 




























































times as many AE survey participants had received information from their workplace and more 
than twice as many from community meetings. School was the least commonly identified 
source of information for both AE and H respondents.
Newspaper None Radio Internet Social 
Media






























Fig. 3. Information sources aiding preparedness for actual experience (AE) and hypothetical (H) survey 
participants.
When asked if they had, in the 12-month period of interest, prepared a plan of action 
should a wildfire occur, very few respondents in either the AE or H surveys reported that they 
had done so (AE: 19%; H: 10%), although quite a number nevertheless felt they knew what to 
do, even if they had not taken the further step of developing that into a formal plan (AE: 42%; 
H: 32%). Despite H respondents appearing slightly less prepared than AE respondents, the 
difference between the two samples regarding having a formal plan vs. no formal plan or plan 
at all did not reach statistical significance (X2(1) = 1.64, p = .200, V = .13). Since the top two 
most common sources of information were newspapers and TV, acquiring knowledge from 
these sources vs. others was compared against whether or not an individual had a formal 
plan. Neither of these sources were significantly associated with having a plan (AE 
Newspaper: had a plan = 29%, had no plan = 71% vs. AE Other Source: had a plan = 13%, 
had no plan = 87%; p = .252, V = .20; H Newspaper: had a plan = 14%, had no plan = 86% 
vs. H Other Source: had a plan = 7%, had no plan = 93%; p = .638, V = .12; and AE TV: had 
a plan = 25%, had no plan = 75% vs. AE Other Source: had a plan = 17%, had no plan = 83%; 
p = .674, V = .09; H TV: had a plan = 19%, had no plan = 81% vs. H Other Source: had a plan 
= 3%, had no plan = 97%; p = .148, V = .26). However, individuals who had received no 
information from any of the suggested sources were significantly more likely to have no plan 
at all (AE: X2(2) = 6.03, p = .049, V = .36; H: p = .030; V = .39). Nevertheless, probing further 




























































with one’s evacuation decision (had a plan: stayed = 100%, evacuated = 0%; had no plan: 
stayed = 73%, evacuated = 27%; p = .542, V = .23). 
As noted above, some survey respondents highlighted that not all information comes from 
official or organised channels and may instead come through more social channels, while the 
interviewees highlighted that everyone in the community must contribute actions to improve 
safety, for others’ as well as for their own sakes; in other words, community closeness is 
important. As a particularity of WUI communities, the majority of participants were expected 
to report close ties to their neighbours; this was indeed the case, with 64% of AE respondents 
and 58% of H respondents reporting a ‘high’ degree of community closeness. However, while 
this closeness might play a role in the prevention and preparedness stages of wildfire 
management, it did not result in a significant association with evacuation decision, where the 
minority (14%) of AE participants reporting ‘high’ community closeness evacuated and the 
majority (86%) stayed, and the same pattern was observed with those reporting ‘low’ 
closeness (evacuated = 38%, stayed = 62%; p = .309, V = .27). 
Turning to individuals, it appeared that not everyone believed they had the ability to control 
the outcomes of wildfires on them and their property: a significantly larger proportion (53%) of 
H participants than AE participants (23%) reported an internal LOC (X2(1) = 4.99, p = .025, V 
= .30). Of those who reported an external LOC, control was most commonly attributed to luck 
(AE = 52%; H = 50%) and least commonly attributed to a spiritual being (AE = 9%; H = 6%). 
Due to the latter result, no test could be conducted specifically on religiousness and 
evacuation decision making. However, a test was conducted for a relationship between AE 
participants’ locus of control more generally and their evacuation decision and the result was 
not significant (internal LOC: stayed = 100%, evacuated = 0%; external LOC: stayed = 71%, 
evacuated = 29%; p = .290, V = .29).
3.3 Responses to a developing wildfire
3.3.1 Interviews
Generally, in Corsica, evacuation is considered to be the last resort and the official 
preferred response to a wildfire is sheltering in place or, as described by the incident 
commanders, ‘confinement’. However, exceptions are made for populations that are 
considered to be vulnerable to wildfire effects and of limited self-efficacy, such as children and 
the elderly. These populations would be evacuated first in advance and it would be the 
responsibility of the mayor of the commune to identify such households where vulnerable 





























































“The appropriate response is to go inside, shut the windows, shutters, close gas, to open the 
gates for firefighters’ vehicles to be able to come in and protect the homes; put the wet 
towels at the doors, close chimneys so that fire cannot go inside; to put the car behind the 
building so that the car is protected by the building and does not burn; there is no time for 
cleaning [outdoors] – it’s too late. If you have automatic sprinklers you can turn it on.” – fire 
officer.
Sheltering indoors is also a preferred option after the evacuation of individuals’ homes is 
chosen. In such cases, the evacuation destination is a safe structure in the town, rather than 
any place outside the area. This is due to mainly three reasons: (1) people’s homes and/or 
other town buildings, such as churches, are architecturally robust stone structures which are 
capable of withstanding most fires; (2) narrow roads, varied topography (hills and slopes), as 
well as vegetation close to the roads, present challenges for road traffic; and (3) most camping 
areas and town surroundings are cleared and thus adequately prepared for firefighting, making 
it relatively safe for people to stay within their homes, or shelter in camping areas; 
nevertheless, it has to be noted that structures such as camper vans, cars, tents and wooden 
homes are seen as unsuitable shelters and thus people are confined within other structures 
such as any concrete/stone buildings or swimming pool areas if such buildings are absent or 
unable to contain large numbers of people.
Another option for campsite occupants is confinement on the beach, if one is available 
nearby. For areas that are not cleared, such as forests, shelters are available and marked, 
and are used as assembly points from which individuals are rescued by fire service transport 
before the fire front arrives. In towns, once people are evacuated and inside a local durable 
structure, such as gymnasium, church or other house known to the authorities, people are 
counted, and their needs assessed.
General patterns of population behaviour in response to wildfires observed by the 
interviewees most of the time included a distinction between the ‘locals’ and ‘tourists’. Certain 
behaviours were described as ‘panic’. These were indicated in the interviews as tunnel-focus 
own priorities (such as putting one’s self at risk to collect belongings, e.g. passport).
 “they are vulnerable to accidents, they focus on one thing and cannot listen” – incident 
commander. 
Interviewees emphasised irrational aspects:
 “When people are stressed, they don’t realise the danger of fire; when they see fire, they 
become completely out of their mind and don’t have fair judgement, the reaction is very 




























































This ‘panic’ behaviour reportedly manifested in potentially hazardous actions such as 
driving fast down the narrow roads:
 “sometimes they are going on the road to escape but it’s very dangerous because they drive 
fast because they are afraid” – fire officer. 
Among all types of resident, lack of experience in evacuation, or in confinement for some 
groups, as well as attachment to one’s home, was an emerging theme in the interviews: 
(“people here are not used to evacuating their home” – incident commander); at the same 
time, when people are told to go indoors and they refuse to do this, it is because “they think 
they will burn in their home” (fire officer).
 “Typical for Mediterranean culture is that their house is often the fruit of their work life, it is 
[their] inheritance or [a] work tool for the farmers” – incident commander.
Thus, specifics of dealing with locals in an evacuation was commonly contrasted to tourist 
behaviour, which was often depicted as careless and disconnected from the local risk culture:
“the way of dealing with locals and tourists is different; first we need to deal with locals who 
don’t want to leave their home, second we deal with summer vacationers who don’t realise 
the danger of the fire and sometimes it’s problematic; you can see tourists on the road taking 
pictures; tourists when they come here they think that Corsica is a forest, that there are no 
rules to follow and they are the king here” – incident commander.
3.3.2 Questionnaires
Here, the interviews broached the subject of the rationality, or irrationality, of behaviours 
during a wildfire. Interviewees offered opinions on what might drive people’s behaviour; the 
following analysis of the questionnaire data turned attention to what the people themselves 
said about what drives their behaviour. This analysis also examined whether behaviours in 
the latter stages of evacuation (i.e. where people go when they evacuate and whether they 
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Of those AE survey participants who evacuated during their wildfire, a small number (n=6) 
provided reasons for why they evacuated at the particular moment they did, while all H survey 
participants answered what their reasons would be for choosing evacuation during a wildfire. 
The majority of AE participants who provided reasons stated that one reason was to protect 
their family (83%). In the H sample, only 2% stated they would choose to evacuate for this 
reason. Instead, the majority of H participants stated they would choose to evacuate if advised 
by police (79%) – a reason only reported by 16% of the aforementioned AE participants (see 
Fig. 4). Other reasons for evacuating given by half or more of the aforementioned AE 
participants were: it was a day of high fire danger (67%), seeing smoke (67%), having 
sufficient time to leave (50%), feeling in danger (50%), seeing flames (50%) and not having 
sufficient resources to stay (50%). Seeing smoke and feeling in danger (52% each) were the 
only other reasons cited by half or more of the H sample. 
The fire did 
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Reason for staying at the property
Fig. 5. Reasons for staying among actual experience (AE) and hypothetical (H) survey participants.
Since the official policy in response to a wildfire in Corsica is confinement, reasons for 
staying were also explored. Of the AE respondents who stayed during their wildfire and 
provided reasons for this (n = 20), the most frequent motivation was because the fire did not 
arrive at their property (60%). Additional reasons included that respondents wanted to protect 
their property or livestock (40%), and because it was a day of high fire danger (40%). Again, 
all H participants provided answers on this subject and the majority of that sample stated that 
they would stay if the fire service or other emergency services (excluding the police) advised 
them to do so (83%), while the next most common reason was staying if advised to do so by 




























































When evacuation was the chosen option, the evacuation destination for the majority of 
respondents in both surveys was a nearby town/village (AE: 80%; H: 28%); 24% of H 
respondents indicated an open area such as a beach would be their place of refuge (which 
was not chosen by any of the AE respondents), 12% stated they would seek refuge in another 
building such as a hall or church (again, not chosen by any AE respondents), and 8% stated 
they would go to another residence nearby (also not chosen by any AE respondents, the 
remaining 20% of whom chose an evacuation destination beyond the locations listed). Finally, 
12% of H respondents stated they did not know where they would go in the event of 
evacuation.
When it comes to returning to one’s evacuated residence before being officially notified 
that it is safe to do so, only two AE respondents said they tried and accomplished this, whereas 
87% of H respondents said they would try and return. Of the AE respondents who returned 
early, their motivation was solely based around a concern for their property: i.e. to see if it had 
survived up to this point and to defend it. Neither respondent reported any concerns about 
looting. The main reason H respondents gave for choosing to return early was they would 
want to check on the safety of family and friends (50%). A sizable proportion also said they 
would return early if, in their opinion, the threat had passed (41%). A concern for defending 
property was the next most common reason (28%). More than a fifth of H respondents stated 
they would return early over a concern about looting (22%). 
4. Discussion
Corsica is an island highly populated with WUI areas and a large number of its communes 
are deemed to be at risk of experiencing wildfires. The island’s disaster response strategy is 
seen to be self-sufficient to face any risk to a certain degree. The reason for self-sufficiency 
was explained by the interviewees to be the available expertise of the firefighters and the 
training that they, as incident commanders, receive in mainland France. However, the main 
challenges for resilience and the vulnerability of the Corsican island seem to be related to 
limited infrastructure capacity to manage multiple fire emergency events at the same time, 
inhibited by relative isolation from the mainland and changing weather conditions, which is 
consistent with findings from other island studies of disasters in general [53]. 
As well as considering the professional disaster response to wildfires, this study 
contributes novel findings regarding how civilians respond. Several key variables, ones 
believed to influence the behavioural responses of civilians, were identified from previous 
literature on wildfires and other disasters. However, the results here indicate those previous 




























































For example, despite previous studies [44,45] showing a relationship between property 
attachment and evacuation decisions, the results here suggest that both permanent residents 
(who should have greater attachment to their property) and temporary residents (who should 
be less attached) are more likely to stay at their locations rather than evacuate in response to 
a wildfire. The divergence in these findings are likely explained by Corsica having and 
commonly practicing a wildfire management policy of ‘confinement’ of individuals within their 
residences, as described by the interviewees.
Regarding the perception of risk and risk culture, this study indicated a certain level of 
confidence among interviewees that locals are better equipped to deal with both the threat 
and presence of wildfires compared to tourists. This emphasised division of locals’ and others’ 
risk perceptions and their behaviour in wildfires in broader terms was also shown by Candea’s 
anthropology of Corsicans [54]. The current study revealed that neither being a permanent vs. 
temporary resident nor wildfire exposure (i.e. occasions of direct experiences with wildfires) 
had a significant association with risk perception. Given all groups were more likely to perceive 
themselves to be at ‘high’ risk, this suggests that the timing of the study (during peak wildfire 
season and therefore during peak media coverage of fires) might have played a role, i.e. 
inflated the ratings of those with less experience of wildfires and from transient populations 
during this time to a level similar to that of more experienced and permanent residents. 
While this presumed hazard knowledge – or hazard awareness at least – may have 
influenced the perception of risk (cf. [47]),across wildfire literature it has nonetheless been 
observed that individuals who feel at risk may not necessarily plan their emergency response 
or even have access to information for such preparedness [45]. Indeed, the interviewees in 
this study put an emphasis on reaching out to communities to educate them on how to respond 
in a fire, and while at least two-thirds of survey participants reported receiving information 
about wildfires from a range of sources, predominantly the mass media, the type of information 
source had no significant impact on reported preparedness (having a plan). The exception 
was those who said they had received no information from the listed sources; they were 
significantly less likely to have prepared a plan of any kind. Indeed, most participants lacked 
a plan, although around a third or more believed they nevertheless ‘knew what to do’. These 
findings somewhat affirm the ‘inherent’ resilience of Corsicans, and island communities in 
particular (discussed in the Introduction) but, as also discussed earlier in this paper, such 
‘resilience’ may additionally indicate underlying vulnerabilities of island communities. 
Furthermore, these findings probably explain why no significant relationship was found 
between perceived risk and evacuation decisions, a result which also contradicts previous 
research findings [44], or between having a plan and evacuation decisions. That is, people in 




























































have paid attention to information sources) that there is a policy of staying in one’s residence 
rather than evacuating when a wildfire occurs. Since ‘confinement’ could be interpreted as a 
more passive than active response, this may lead people to not contemplate further what may 
actually be required of them should they stay and, in the event of staying not being feasible, 
what may be required of them should they go. Thus, those with even an informal ‘plan’ (which 
may most likely be to stay) may only be prepared for situations where such a plan is suitable, 
while those with no plan at all may be completely unprepared for either staying or evacuating 
and therefore their behavioural response may be unpredictable.
Therefore, community closeness may not have the kind of influence on evacuation in 
Corsica in the event of a wildfire as it has been found to have in studies of other regions and 
types of disaster [20,48] – not because it may not exist in Corsica, but because even where 
people are close to their neighbours, those neighbours may be similarly without a plan or only 
have heard about the authorities’ policy to stay. Indeed, a form of community closeness – 
community collaboration (with the authorities, in the form of obeying official wildfire mitigation 
rules, as well as with other civilians) and community cohesion – was a recurring theme in the 
interviews, as well as in the literature on island and WUI communities [57]. It was also 
supported by the questionnaire data where the majority of both surveys’ respondents reported 
a ‘high’ degree of social closeness to their neighbours. Yet, the majority of AE survey 
respondents, irrespective of whether they reported high or low closeness, seemed to go along 
with the official policy, i.e. in most cases stayed and sheltered indoors rather than evacuated. 
The final key variable explored in relation to behavioural responses was LOC. Despite a 
number of survey participants expressing a belief that they knew what to do in the event of a 
wildfire, fewer among the AE respondents believed that their own actions could control what 
happens to them in a wildfire, i.e. AE respondents tended more towards an external LOC, 
which was more commonly identified as luck than government authorities or emergency 
services. Luck was also far more commonly identified as the external LOC than was a spiritual 
being, which suggests that any future research on the topic of LOC and disaster responses 
may need a broader scope than that seen to date [20,51,52]. This was one of the few areas 
where AE respondents answered differently to H respondents, who tended more towards an 
internal LOC. Such disparity is somewhat intuitive since while AE respondents were asked to 
answer the LOC question based on what they believed prior to their recent wildfire experience, 
most AE respondents had already experienced other incidents before that, possibly with 
diverse outcomes, and these experiences could have left respondents with a sense of 
helplessness against the forces of fire. Indeed, several interviewees from the fire services 
reported that people often discovered they had overestimated their chances of standing 




























































significant relationship between LOC and AE respondents’ evacuation decisions, and further 
highlights the potential vulnerability raised by a lack of planning, particularly for evacuation 
where staying is not viable. 
Overall, it is important to note that while neither property attachment, perceived risk, 
planning for wildfires, community closeness, nor LOC predicted whether AE participants 
evacuated or stayed, those participants nonetheless did reveal the actual motivations for their 
behaviour, such as leaving due to a wish to protect their families and/or because they 
recognised signs of risk (e.g. noted it was a day of high fire danger, saw smoke), whereas the 
majority of H participants stated they would choose to evacuate if advised by the police. H 
participants’ motivation for choosing to stay was also predominantly based around emergency 
service advice. It is possible that the dissimilarity between AE and H participants’ answers 
here reflect the fact that the intentions of practiced behaviours can tend to be thought of more 
in terms of why an action is ultimately performed (for the protection of one’s family), whereas 
intentions that have not been put into practice yet, as in hypothetical scenarios, may be 
thought of more in terms of how an action is initiated (by the emergency services issuing 
advice) [58]. The results on motivations also suggest that situational factors manifesting close 
to or during the wildfire may have been more influential here on decision making than 
situational or trait factors manifesting some time earlier.
Behavioural responses do not end with the decision to evacuate or stay, and this study 
explored what issues may arise with the island’s WUI populations after a decision to evacuate 
is made. When a fire actually occurs, the reactions of ‘others’ (identified as newcomers from 
mainland France or tourists) while more easily managed in one sense, since they are 
reportedly more obedient than locals when given official evacuation orders (also evidenced in 
[55]), were noted by interviewees to be dangerously emotional when acting on their own 
instincts. For example, interviewees described tourists displaying ‘panic’, driving on the roads 
in a state of fear without being aware of the complexity of the topography and narrow roads 
and therefore of the risks (e.g. of getting trapped, of approaching instead of withdrawing from 
hazards, or of causing a crash), and risk-taking when stopping for photographs of the fire or 
engaging in other forms of careless behaviour. Although scholars (e.g. [56]) reject the notion 
that people panic en masse when faced with a disaster, these observations suggest there 
could be some groups more prone to hasty and unthinking behavioural responses. If so, on 
an island where such groups comprise a considerable portion of the overall population during 
the wildfire season, this could be particularly problematic. The reason why a division between 
locals and tourists may seem to exist can be found in the interviewees’ claim that locals’ 
awareness of wildfires begins early, during their school education, and continues through 




























































and how people can and should behave in turn. In contrast, tourists’ awareness of wildfires 
may be more recent and their understanding cursory. Note, while the questionnaire data 
revealed school to be the least frequent source of information about wildfires, this is likely an 
artefact of the study’s inclusion criteria requiring survey participants to be adults aged 18 years 
or older while the question asked about information gained in a 12-month period, i.e. a time 
when many participants will have no longer been in school.
Compared to those with no prior experience of evacuation, AE participants who had 
evacuated previously were more likely to state they would evacuate in a future fire. This 
indicates that evacuation had a successful outcome for them, ensuring their safety. However, 
two other findings indicate that the safety of evacuees could potentially be compromised. First, 
the lack of AE (and H) participants selecting to evacuate to a building such as a hall or church 
suggests that they are not aware of the official evacuation shelters in their locality or such 
shelters have not been designated. In addition, upon arrival at an evacuation destination, a 
willingness to attempt to return to residences before receiving official notification that it was 
okay to do so – an issue widely recognised in the literature [33] – was reported by 
questionnaire respondents as well as interviewees, although few AE participants actually 
accomplished this feat. Given the high proportion of H participants who expressed this 
tendency, this challenges the interviewees’ assertion that locals inherently know what is 
appropriate in a wildfire and highlights that human behaviour, not just fire behaviour, is 
dynamic (i.e. people may get away but not always stay away). To ensure the best outcomes 
in a wildfire, both civilians and professionals need to consider and understand – in advance – 
the various permutations of how a situation may develop, as well as the risks and resources 
each one entails. 
5. Conclusions
Analysis showed that Corsica is facing wildfire safety risks due to population increase 
during peak tourist seasons, growing urban areas and drier and warmer weather conditions 
due to changing land use. The interviews opened up for discussion further vulnerabilities such 
as logistical challenges in receiving practical support from the EU and mainland France, which 
have not received much attention in the research literature to date. Factors which have 
received more attention, i.e. reported behavioural influencers such as property attachment, 
perceived risk, hazard knowledge, community closeness and locus of control, were not found 
to play a significant role here in survey participants’ wildfire responses, suggesting that island 
WUI residents have specific characteristics and/or different determinants. Therefore, while 




























































behaviour in wildfires carried out in regions with considerable expertise in such matters (i.e. 
USA, Australia), they should also commission further research to be conducted in their own 
regions, in order to establish which behavioural responses can be generalised and which are 
more specific to their particular settings. That way, policies and ensuing practices can be 
shaped to best meet the circumstances of the people at whom they are directed. 
The main behavioural response studied in the survey analysis was evacuation decision-
making. Most participants – regardless of whether they had actually experienced at least one 
wildfire recently or lacked experience and were answering about hypothetical scenarios – 
chose to stay and shelter indoors rather than evacuate, demonstrating that official policy was 
being successfully communicated to residents and complied with. However, this reliance on 
confinement suggests that the island’s residents, particularly those who have not experienced 
a wildfire, recently or ever, would not be well prepared for a situation where evacuation 
became the best option. Thus, policymakers should consider means of including evacuation 
as a more viable option under suitable circumstances, and consider whether it is often viewed 
as a last resort measure because environmental aspects (e.g. speed and severity of the fire, 
wind, etc.) hinder its enactment or because human aspects (e.g. lack of preparedness and 
planning) are the hindrance. Especially since a lack of planning was evident, with H survey 
participants displaying that further through a heavy reliance on the emergency services to 
make the decision about whether to stay or evacuate, and through some indecisiveness with 
regards to an evacuation destination. While it is understandable that such decisions would 
depend on the situation, a lack of certainty and intuitiveness in respondents may indicate that 
more information on how to independently assess the risks and on available options for 
evacuation sheltering is needed. Another potentially unsafe behaviour highlighted was ingress 
attempts. If carried out in the proportions suggested by H participants, this would put a serious 
drain on emergency service resources regarding traffic management and life protection. In 
addition, since the main reasons for return were related to concerns about either property or 
others, communities should be assured by the authorities regarding their property security and 
receive better education with regards to how to contact loved ones during an emergency (e.g. 
preparing in advance a plan of where to meet if not initially together, using phone and online 
single-click apps that allow people to notify others that they are safe and well). 
Ultimately, the findings suggest disparity in some areas between expected (“[Corsican 
locals] know what we have to do”) and actual behaviours and strategies. Moreover, given the 
dynamics in the socio-cultural climate and new/temporary residents moving to the island each 
year, who reportedly have less developed risk cultures and are more emotionally driven, levels 
of resilience may alter as a result. Thus, as vulnerabilities are uncovered, it is important that 




























































increasingly being observed in European islands. If the frequency of disruption to communities 
due to wildfire evacuations continues to rise, then island WUI communities must be mentally 
and physically prepared for such an eventuality.
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